|
| | IIFET `96 Conference Papers. References to all papers presented at the IIFET `96 Conference, with abstracts and links to full text documents when available. | | | |
CollectorString=(in:7561) AND (kot:documents OR kot:events OR kot:institution OR kot:jobs OR kot:maps OR kot:news OR kot:projects OR kot:"web-sites") AND isarchived:n |
|  | | | | Title | Analysis of a highly migratory fish stocks fishery: a game theoretic approach
( Document )
| | Author(s) / Editor(s) | Naito, T.; Polasky, S. | | Description | There is great concern at present that fish stocks are being depleted by over-fishing. Part of the problem of over-fishing is caused by the common property nature of the fishery resources. In particular, high seas fishery resources, such as highly migratory fish stocks (HMFS) and straddling fish stocks, suffer from over-fishing because one country does not take into account the detrimental effect that its harvest has on other fishing countries. Recently, the United Nations sponsored a conference to discuss the conservation and management of these fish stocks. This paper develops a model of an HMFS fishery as a two-period non cooperative dynamic game. In each period there are two stages. In the first stage, the fish stock is located in the Exclusive Economic Zone (EEZ) of a coastal state, which has an exclusive right to harvest the fish stock, in the second stage, the fish migrate to the high seas where remaining stock can be harvested by distant water fishing (DWF) states. Remaining stock grows subject to a biological growth function and migrate back to the EEZ to begin another period. The game is solved for a sub-game perfect equilibrium. We examine the effect of new entrants on HMFS fishery and rents derived from the fishery. New entrants lead to a larger harvest and rent dissipation. The loss in rents for any given number of fishing states can be calculated by comparing equilibrium rents with rents earned in a cooperative fishery, which maximizes the present value of rent. With open-access in the second stage, resource rent is totally dissipated for DWF states but not for the coastal state, which still earns a positive rent. The model also shows that the current EEZ on an HMFS fishery benefits the coastal state and increases both total equilibrium harvest and resource rent from the fishery. | | Keywords | & | | Geography Keywords | & | | Content Language(s) | English | |
| Publisher | Office Nationale de la Peche, Maroc (ONP, Morocco) | | Publication Location | Casablanca, Morocco | | Publication Date | 2002 | | Hard Copy Availability | Contact IIFET@oregonstate.edu | |
|
|
|
|
|
| | |
|
|
|
| |
Editor(s) | | · | Ann Shriver | |
Topic Info | | · | ID: 7561 | | · | Visits: 671 | | · | Added: 01 January 2000 | | · | Updated: 21 October 2000 | | · | URL: http://www.onefish.org/id/7561 | |
KO Owner | | · | Duc Phan | |
KO Info | | · | ID: 262454 | | · | Visits:
3 | | · | Added:
23 May 2005 | | · | Updated:
23 May 2005 | | · | URL:
http://www.onefish.org/id/262454 | | |
|
