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CollectorString=(in:6465) AND (kot:documents OR kot:events OR kot:institution OR kot:jobs OR kot:maps OR kot:news OR kot:projects OR kot:"web-sites") AND isarchived:n
TitleA value-based individual transferable quota scheme- a preliminary examination of its suitability as a fisheries management technique  ( Document )
Author(s) / Editor(s)Willmann, R.
DescriptionAn ITQ scheme has been shown to create a quota induced incentive for discarding of fish in excess of what is socially optimal. This finding is corroborated by empirical evidence in several ITQ managed fisheries. The incentive for discarding, over and above those expected in an unmanaged or input controlled fishery, may arise because of two reasons: firstly, in the case of a single species fishery, it can be advantageous to substitute low priced with high priced size classes of fish thereby increasing the value of a given quota; secondly, where transaction costs in quota trading are high, species may be discarded for which no quota is held or for which catches have surmounted current quota holdings. The proposed approach of assigning value based individual transferable quotas (VITQs) would remove the quota induced incentive for high grading, and can reduce costs of quota trading. Furthermore, in the case of multi species fisheries, VITQs may allow fishermen to respond with greater flexibility to changes in species abundances than under an ITQ system, and may confer greater economic stability. A value based individual quota would assign a maximum landed value of the catch, which could be taken in a certain period of time (e.g. year). The catch would be composed of a basket of pre determined species or would need to be taken from one or several assigned fishing zones areas, or a combination of both. The proposed system may depict a compensatory mechanism against excessive targeting of any one single species, but if this could result in a desirable exploitation, pattern would depend on growth rates catchability coefficients and price elasticities of the various species in the basket or fishing zone.
Keywords&
Geography Keywords&NEW ZEALAND
Content Language(s)English
PublisherOffice Nationale de la Peche, Maroc (ONP, Morocco)
Publication LocationCasablanca, Morocco
Publication Date2002
Hard Copy AvailabilityContact IIFET@oregonstate.edu
  
 Editor(s)
 ·Ann Shriver
 Topic Info
 · ID: 6465
 · Visits: 1622
 · Added: 01 January 2000
 · Updated: 12 May 2004
 · URL: http://www.onefish.org/id/6465
 KO Owner
 · Duc Phan
 KO Info
 · ID: 263564
 · Visits: 1
 · Added: 23 May 2005
 · Updated: 23 May 2005
 · URL: http://www.onefish.org/id/263564
 
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